Shaping Migrants as Threats:  Multilayered Discretion, Criminalization, and Risk Assessment Tools by Gundhus, Helene O. I.
IJCJ&SD 10(3) 2021   ISSN 2202-8005 
 
© The Author(s) 2021 
 
Shaping Migrants as Threats: Multilayered Discretion, 
Criminalization, and Risk Assessment Tools 
 
 
Helene O. I. Gundhus 
University of Oslo; Norwegian Police University College, Norway 
 
Abstract 
This article examines Operation Migrant, initiated by the Norwegian police following the so-
called migration crises in Europe in 2015. One of its central aims was, by predicting 
challenges related to increased migration, to improve resource allocation and prevent crime. 
By drawing on research on risk and threat assessment as a form of power, this article aims 
to analyze how risk categories are distributed and translated into a multilayered institutional 
arrangement where migration is policed as a potential crime. The article examines the 
indicators that the risk assessments are based on, and the measures applied and investigates 
how discretionary practices make immigrants objects for law enforcement and policing. The 
article contributes to research on migration control in an ordinary police context, where 
immigration identity checks become part of the crime reduction strategy. Applying the 
concept of interpretive flexibility (Collins 1981), I will identify the steps in this chain of 
translation to explore the leap from targeting potentially criminal asylum seekers to 
targeting broader groups with temporary residency in Norway. The article analyzes the 
conditions determining how policing, technologies, and migrants are “co-constructed” in a 
chain of mediation and translation, which reinforces the view of migrants as risky and 
criminal. The final section discusses how risk and threat analysis is affected by the notion of 
the “crimmigrant other” (Franko 2020). In Norway, selectively targeting unwanted migrants 
as criminals has become dominant in police decision-making at a policy level and everyday 
practices affecting not only third country nationals but also unwanted eastern Europeans. 
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Introduction 
 
This article examines Operation Migrant, initiated by the Norwegian police following the so-called 
migration crises in Europe in 2015. One of its central aims was, by predicting challenges related to 
increased migration, to improve resource allocation and prevent crime. Part of the strategy was to initiate 
a tactical law-enforcement operation in the police districts. By drawing on research on risk and threat 
assessments as forms of power, this article aims to analyze how risk categories are distributed and 
translated into a multilayered institutional arrangement where migration is policed as a potential crime. 
The article will examine the indicators that the risk assessments are based on, and the measures applied 
and investigate how discretionary practices make immigrants objects for law enforcement and policing. In 
Europe, the multilayered legal and governance structure allows legal, policy, and institutional discretion, 
making national views important for border practices (van der Woude 2020) and bordered penality (Aas 
2013). Therefore, the article contributes to research on migration control in an ordinary police context, 
where immigration identity checks become part of the crime reduction strategy. The prevailing 
intelligence-led policing model, implemented by Frontex at the European level and by local police districts 
in Norway, together with high Norwegian performance indicators for deportation, demonstrates why risk 
profiling has net-widening effects. Applying the concept of interpretive flexibility (Collins 1981), I will 
identify the steps in this chain of translation to explore the leap from targeting potentially criminal asylum 
seekers to targeting broader groups with temporary residency in Norway. 
 
The article has four parts. First, I describe the theoretical context of research on risk and discretion and 
then present the contextual aspects of policing migration in Europe and Norway, especially the social 
construction of risk. After the methodology section, the results section gives empirical examples of risk 
assessment tools and decision-making processes in Operation Migrant. The argument will focus on the 
leap from strategy to implementation into everyday policing practices in Norway. The article analyzes the 
conditions determining how policing, technologies, and migrants are “co-constructed” in a chain of 
mediation and translation, which reinforces the view of migrants as risky and criminal. The final section 
discusses how risk and threat analysis is affected by the notion of the “crimmigrant other” (Franko 2020). 
In Norway, selectively targeting unwanted migrants as criminals has become dominant in police decision-
making at the policy level and everyday practices affecting not only third country nationals but also 
unwanted eastern Europeans. 
 
Multilayered Discretion and Risk Assessment 
 
In this article, the concept of “translation” from science and technology studies (STS) is applied to 
investigate the processes shaping risk-based assessment, from the European level to the streets of police 
districts. The concept is important for understanding the steps in decision-making as a “chain of 
translation” (Callon 1984; Latour 1999: 311). Egbert and Leese (2020: 45) argue that understanding 
translation in a policing context allows them to investigate the “hinges” of predictive policing processes, 
such as how data is turned into crime. I will use this approach to look at how risk estimates produced by 
intelligence become translated, criticized, confirmed, and communicated and how organizational logics 
bring such insights into policing on the street. The STS concept “interpretive flexibility” will be helpful here 
in pointing to the “capacity of a specific technology (or other knowledge system) to sustain the divergent 
interpretations of multiple groups” (Sahay and Robey 1996: 260). The role of user engagement in 
interpreting and appropriating the flexibility of knowledge systems has been important in this school of 
thought (i.e., see Doherty, Coombs, and Loan-Clarke 2006; Orlikowski 1992). Therefore, I will examine how 
different layers and risk assessment tools are brought together to manage migration. 
 
Concepts derived from risk assessment and risk governance theory can help to understand how the 
multilayered border and use of risk assessment tools are affecting discretionary practices (van Asselt and 
Renn 2011), here defined as complex decisions taken at different levels (Lempert 1992). The assumption 
that controlling discretion and decision-making are linked to control at the street level ignores how 
decision-making often involves many complex judgments (Lempert 1992). Such a top-down approach 
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assumes that change means management strengthening its government control at the street level. A more 
holistic approach to discretion includes decisions made at the level of legislation and policy as well as of 
enforcement (Bushway and Forst 2013; van der Woude and van der Leun 2017), and here, digital data 
processing tools are important. Galligan (1986) argues that the most prominent factor in the 
“discretionary process lies within legislative and policy decisions,” but most studies only address 
enforcement and, thus, ignore policy-making. In police studies, street-level discretionary powers are 
portrayed as obstacles to the implementation of new strategies (Gundhus 2017). Therefore, in this article, 
I will examine discretionary practices and interpretive flexibility at different levels. 
 
Precautionary approaches to managing migration are guided by securitization logics, framing it as 
something to avoid, and are informed by models of security and the threat nexus (Aradau and van Munster 
2007; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; Huysmans 2000; Ibrahim and Howarth 2017). Van Munster 
(2009) posits that, through improved information coordination and dissemination, Frontex analyzes 
migration and border control risks in a way that makes certain migrants objects of suspicion and targets 
of precautionary risk-management practices. 
 
A strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence operation is deployed in the police districts, supported by 
a national criminal intelligence system. The National Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) is responsible 
for producing intelligence and risk analyses, working in close collaboration with Frontex, the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency, and Europol. Combating what Frontex (2019: 7) terms “illegal 
immigration” is an important area for cooperation locally, nationally, and internationally. The declared 
aim of Frontex is to prevent, detect, and suppress cross-border crime and irregular immigration, and it 
declares that intelligence and collaboration with EU states will support decisions on how to achieve this. 
At the same time, the fundamental rights of refugees are high on its agenda, as noted by several researchers 
(Aas and Gundhus 2014; Perkowski 2016).1 However, in practice, Frontex applies a pragmatic 
management approach to risk analysis, emphasizing state security: 
 
A key aspect developed in the CIRAM [Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model] is the 
adoption of a management approach to risk analysis that defines risk as a function of threat, 
vulnerability and impact . . . According to the model, a “threat” is a force or pressure acting 
upon the external borders that is characterised by both its magnitude and likelihood; 
“vulnerability” is defined as the capacity of a system to mitigate the threat; and “impact” is 
determined as the potential consequences of the threat. (Frontex 2021) 
 
The risk or threat language that is used is instrumental, and, as the quote highlights, vulnerability means 
threats to borders, not migrants’ vulnerability. The indicators generating the risk analysis are, therefore, 
criticized for protecting states, not migrants (Aas and Gundhus 2014; Gundhus 2018). Applying the 
precautionary risk perception to migration and border control could thus mean that risk avoidance causes 
state security to take precedence over human security and human rights obligations (Gundhus 2018; 
Gundhus and Jansen 2020). Gundhus (2018) points out, for instance, that in using CIRAM to analyze the 
risks related to migration and border control, the Frontex framework takes vulnerabilities and threats as 
indicators that lead to migration being seen as a threat. CIRAM-based Frontex operations thus lack a 
systematic evaluation of the consequences of practices and fail to take migrant security into account. The 
criminalization of migrants caused by closing borders is obscured. The language used by Frontex, like the 
formulation of their approach to risk analysis, is intended to influence national decision-makers when they 
set priorities, formulate countermeasures, and designate operational targets (Frontex 2021). Andersson 
(2016a) argues: 
 
Through its large Risk Analysis Unit and its Europe-wide network for collating data on border 
crossings (Frontex Risk Analysis Network), Frontex “exports” risk thinking to member state 
agencies, reinforcing the threat and security frames in operation on [the] national level, while 
contributing to the prioritisation of migration controls at the external borders above other 
tasks. (Andersson 2016a: 1061) 
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This exporting of risk-thinking is intended to affect discretionary practices in member states. 
 
The multilayered arrangements for Schengen members are designed to achieve common standards and 
share knowledge, information, and communication technologies. Eurosur aims to support the more 
effective use of national border control resources by creating European uniformity (Jeandesboz 2016). 
Risk analysis and Eurosur seek common understandings of risks and threats and impose a language of risk 
(Aas 2011; Bigo and Guild 2005; Ibrahim and Howarth 2017; Jeandesboz 2016). As this research shows, 
intelligence and multiagency arrangements support decisions to prevent, detect, and suppress cross-
border crime and irregular migration. In this paper, we follow how risk assessments of migration are 
transferred from European to ordinary police districts. However, discretion in decision-making also opens 
the way for the politicization of police processes. Van der Woude (2020) argues: 
 
The very existence of discretion, on different levels, therefore allows states and state-actors 
to engage in the “scale jumping practices” and “jurisdictional games” to shape present 
national policies and practices in such a way that they are seen as most beneficial for the well-
being and security of the country. (van der Woude 2020: 6) 
 
Risk analysis revealing border vulnerabilities and threats is, therefore, important for supporting decisions 
about resource allocation at both the EU and Norwegian level (Gundhus and Jansen 2020; Horii 2016). 
Given the nexus between migrants and threats, such topics as the deviant immigrant and migration and 
securitization have been exhaustively studied in recent years (for an overview, see Franko 2020; 
Huysmans 2006, 2014). Frontex has securitized managerial and humanitarian rationalities (Perkowski 
2016). It is also deeply involved in national security policies, and Horii’s (2016) view of Frontex risk 
analysis as a “form of power” is significant. Risk analysis gives decision-makers arguments and reveals 
understandings of what security is, how it is threatened, and what solutions are necessary and appropriate 
(Horii 2016). As we will see, this problematization sometimes diverges due to interpretive flexibility and 
local understandings of risks and threats. Therefore, I will investigate what the multilayered structuring 
of risk intelligence in European networks and bureaucracies means for local understandings of 
“crimmigrant deviance” and “risky identity” and the resultant exercise of discretion. 
 
Policing Migration in Europe and Norway—A Multilayered Arrangement 
 
The Norwegian police participate in Frontex at the European level. There is only one police service in 
Norway, and the agencies included in it are the National Police Directorate, the NCIS, the National Police 
Immigration Service, and the police districts; all were involved in Operation Migrant. In 2014, the 
Norwegian police adopted intelligence-led policing as a general practice, and Operation Migrant was 
implemented within that framework as the first national intelligence-led policing project. The Norwegian 
model of intelligence-led policing is constructed as a business model that defines intelligence as an 
organizational process ensuring that verified information guides managers’ decision-making (Police 
Directorate 2014). A major objective is to match the use of force and resources to the actual threat, putting 
actionable knowledge to use. 
 
Since 2012, in larger cities, the Norwegian police have made use of coercive and investigative powers 
granted by immigration law in criminal cases (Franko 2020). Studies of crimmigration processes in 
Norway find that officers speak of “changing track” and the advantages of being able to choose between 
criminal and administrative tracks when policing target groups, depending on their objectives, the groups 
involved, and the availability of resources (Aas 2014: 524; Gundhus and Franko 2016). 
 
Although there is collaboration with travel agencies on passenger name record systems and customs 
(Nøkleberg 2019), immigration policing is mainly carried out by the police districts; they are responsible 
for law enforcement and crime prevention, along with territorial, border, and immigration control. The 
Norwegian Immigration Directorate is separate from the police and is the civil public administration 
authority responsible for handling immigration cases. It works closely with the Norwegian Police 
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Immigration Service. The Norwegian Immigration Directorate relies on the police as its executive organ 
for control and implementing decisions. The Norwegian Police Immigration Service is responsible for 
registering asylum seekers and carrying out deportations, including forced returns, and runs the only 
closed detention center in Norway, Trandum (Ugelvik 2016). Almost all aspects of border control, 
including deportation orders, are carried out by local police units in police districts. 
 
Through its participation in Schengen, Norway’s approach to policing migration is closely affected by 
global and EU border policies and practices. Frontex2 was established in 2004 but has gradually expanded 
its autonomy since then, and in 2016, it became the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. It works 
increasingly closely with Europol and promotes itself as a law enforcement agency combating human 
smuggling and irregular migration (Franko 2020). Sharing data through “smart solutions” is widespread 
and ever increasing in controlling mobility (Bigo 2014; Jeandesboz 2016). However, as Dekkers (2019) 
argues, it varied to what degree the information technology affects the decision-making by border officers 
since it is perceived too general. It shapes decision-making on a political and higher organizational level, 
but experience is more important for frontline decision-making. 
 
Through translation and operationalization through the Frontex Risk Analysis Network, the discourse of 
risk is reinforced and negotiated in a highly political context (Andersson 2016a, 2016b). The nature of 
contemporary forms of cross-border police cooperation demonstrates the expansion of its geographic 
scope, the intensification of information exchange, and the increased integration of previously relatively 
discrete systems (see inter alia Bigo 2008; Hufnagel 2013; Jeandesboz 2016). 
 
As argued by van der Woude (2020), these multiscalar arrangements also allow flexibility and a measure 
of discretion. In Norway, this mainly manifests in how territorial control and national border control are 
carried out. At the same time, police discretion needs to be limited to achieve the target figures for 
deportation set by the politicians and the police. The decision-making process is not one-dimensional and 
static but dynamic and variable. Regarding risk assessment and management practices as a form of power 
moving across different actors and being translated, I will approach the multilayered system involved in 
the social production of the crimmigrant other by examining Operation Migrant. The operation was 
initiated by the police and encouraged by knowledge transfers from Frontex (Gundhus and Jansen 2020). 
Its aim was to produce risk and threat reports for police management to help them make better decisions 
on resource allocation, priorities, and tactics in their management of the influx of migrants. A central aim 





The author was granted access to all the intelligence reports and the strategic and concluding documents 
describing Operation Migrant, which were used to analyze the production and negotiation of risks and 
threats. The reports on unaccompanied minors are of particular interest to this article. These reports are 
confidential, so they cannot be referred to; the empirical analysis is based on interviews.3 The interviewees 
from the Operation Migrant project were mostly managers, coordinators, and operational analysts trained 
as police officers, but also included analysts with academic backgrounds and managers with legal training. 
They had various roles in the project; some were contracting entities, intelligence managers, information 
managers, analysts (operational and strategic), and data collectors. Because of confidentiality issues 
regarding sensitive empirical data, including the intelligence reports, the project was authorized by the 
National Police Directorate. The topics discussed with interviewees included their role in the operation, 
how they felt it developed, the deployment of the intelligence cycle, the relationship between intelligence 
products and the measures, collaboration with other police districts and agencies, and lessons learned 
from the operation. Interviews were designed to find out how the operation was carried out, different 
ways of understanding risks and threats, how the actors perceived their roles, how daily routines were 
developed, how well the overall process was coordinated, and how it supported decision-makers in 
planning measures. We also asked questions about the content of the thematic reports and the strengths 
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and weaknesses of the intelligence doctrine and technological tools. The move from risks to action plans 
was discussed in detail. We also participated in a process evaluation of the operation, and this might have 
increased trust during the interviews, which were marked by a self-critical and constructive spirit. The 
interviews were examined using a combination of thematic and narrative analyses, which is a good way of 
looking at accounts of risks since thematic analysis considers “what” the interviewees are talking about, 
while narrative analysis considers “why” and “how”—justifications and reasoning (Sandberg 2010). 
 
This study is part of research exploring shifts in the understanding of policing and risk or threat 
assessment, which is why the findings are analyzed in a broader context. This broader project includes 
focus group interviews conducted between 2017 and 2018 with 24 police officers (12 in frontline patrols 
and 12 in frontline investigation) and 16 key informants4 following police reforms initiated after the terror 
attacks in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July 2011. Also included are fieldwork and interviews with ordinary 
patrols and special immigrations units in the police districts and a project using intelligence measures to 
prevent youth crime in an area of Oslo (n = 35).5 The broader project provides data, through retrospective 
interviews, on how Operation Migrant was operationalized on the ground. 
 
Policing Migrants—Policing Crimmigrant Others 
 
Drawing on interviews with participants in Operation Migrant, I will first introduce the strategic part of 
the intelligence operation and then describe how it was carried out in the police districts. As mentioned, 
the operation was initiated by the National Police Directorate in response to the influx of migrants in the 
summer of 2015. This influx reached a peak of 31,145 asylum seekers, 70 percent arriving between 
September 2015 and January 2016.6 All European states responded to the increased number of migrants 
by developing ways to combat irregular mobility, and territorial borders were closed. Talk about a “crisis” 
raised concerns about the security of nation-states amid increased anxiety about terrorist attacks and 
issues regarding crime and public safety that might result from the influx and lack of identity checks 
(Gundhus and Jansen 2020). Public opinion was marked by an overblown fear caused by the high number 
of migrants. Operation Migrant, according to the interviewees, was, therefore, initiated as a rational and 
“cool” response to a heated and emotional debate in a “hot” atmosphere. 
 
To a certain extent, the National Police Directorate followed the initiatives taken by Frontex. Some of the 
information gathering was carried out by Frontex, and the Norwegian operation made use of Frontex risk 
assessment products, which calculated the likelihood of an increased number of migrants arriving in 
Norway. With the core aim of intelligence being to reduce decision-makers’ uncertainty, Operation Migrant 
was conceived as a national intelligence project; it was, therefore, necessary to have a common knowledge 
base so that resource allocation could be better targeted in the way described by this interviewee: 
 
Ideally, we should help to anticipate threats. The Police Directorate wanted something they 
can use to base their decisions and priorities on. And they wanted information about events 
before things arise, which is not so easy. We also used intelligence reports from the other 
Nordic countries, and reports from Frontex and Europol. (NPIC 9) 
 
As we were told in the interviews, the intelligence hub at NCIS had first to provide figures and predictions 
about the number of asylum seekers or migrants arriving in Norway, their nationalities, and the 
percentage of single unaccompanied asylum seekers, and how this compared with the figures in other 
European countries. The second step was to provide reports on the number of asylum seekers or migrants 
expected to arrive in Norway and on which border crossings were being used and expected to be used in 
the future. The third question was about the crime and public insecurity that could be expected from 
migration: did crime result from increased inflows, and did they affect public safety? Could the police see 
any trends or instances of crime connected with the flow of migrants, such as disturbances or unrest in the 
rest of the population (Police Directorate 2015)? While considering these questions, the intelligence hub 
was required to report weekly on police resource utilization and resource needs, requirements for 
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coordination, the use of police effort, and needs for additional grants to handle the migrant situation, for 
example, by closing borders. A police analyst describes the difficulty of identifying threats: 
 
There were several concerns about who the people coming were. Were they terrorists? The 
focus for a long time was on whether terrorists hide among immigrants. Many of them are 
traumatized, come from areas where certainly, or at least very probably, they have been 
involved in a war. There are questions about the person’s identity and there is a lack of 
certainty about it, etc. These were issues that one was supposed to try to include properly in 
reports. (NPIC 9) 
 
The intelligence hub identified 132 information requirements to provide intelligence on these matters, 
which police districts had to report on. Some of these were perceived as rather vague: 
 
In the beginning a lot was unclear. There were a lot of information needs that the Police 
Directorate required intelligence about, which did not necessarily prove to be anything real 
you could collect. There was no information on it, or one could not be as detailed as they 
required. (NPIC 9) 
 
This category included, for example, information about unstable people who had the capacity to cause 
great harm and about named terrorist groups. The main sources reported were internal intelligence items 
from police databases in the police districts. Other sources were social media, news, and reports from 
police associates in Europe, particularly Frontex and Europol, Interpol, embassies, and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The information gathered was coordinated by the intelligence project’s information 
manager, broken down, and distributed to strategic analysts. Weekly reports were requested on various 
types of crime to identify the potential crimes that could be related to migration, such as human smuggling, 
false ID, drugs, and crime among unaccompanied minors, together with information on the prevalence of 
vigilante groups. Weekly reports were made on the likelihood of rises in the numbers of asylum seekers 
and on the increased crime related to this. Irregular migrants, including those with legitimate protection 
needs, were defined primarily in terms of their risk qualities—as threats. “Risk” was rarely mentioned by 
the Norwegian police. However, threat is a commonly used concept, as this quote from one of the project’s 
information managers put it: 
 
But what we are good at is threats, but even that . . . I just think we do not theorize this very 
much. It is really about the social mission of the police, who may be doing something wrong? 
(NPIC 4) 
 
The intelligence hub collected data to predict whether future crimes or threats to public safety were likely 
caused by individuals or groups. The obtained data were generally collected manually without much 
support from software systems. To a certain degree, the idea of the border as being threatened has leached 
into perceptions of migrants as possible criminals due to the police logic referred to above, which 
reinforces perceptions of migrants as “crimmigrant others.” However, participants from the intelligence 
hub felt strongly that their main task was to “negate concerns” coming from within police institutions and 
elsewhere, such as politicians, newspapers, and other media. Thus, an important finding was that, since 
public opinion was marked by exaggerated fears arising from the increased number of migrants, the 
intelligence hub saw their role as being to dispel myths and provide reassurance: 
 
One can see, at least the alertness was taken down. This kind of report where you can say, 
“Okay, that’s what we actually know, we know about it,” it creates a sense of security. (NPIC 
8) 
 
They saw their mission as providing a calmer, more balanced, nuanced, and correct picture of the situation 
(Gundhus and Jansen 2020). They also felt that their reports helped calm fears about the big issues of crime 
carried out by youngsters (both violence and drug-related offenses), sexual harassment by asylum seekers, 
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and crime connected with unaccompanied minors escaping from reception centers. This sensemaking of 
the situation also informed how the situation was interpreted. To a certain extent, they felt that, by being 
involved in the operation, they functioned as brakes on populist politics and the culture of control resulting 
from fear. 
 
The Making of the Crimmigrant Youngster 
 
Operation Migrant issued five thematic reports on sexual offenses; human trafficking; human smuggling; 
international war crimes; and the potential for serious violence, including that carried out by mentally 
unstable people and drug addicts and for serious damage. A sixth thematic report commissioned by the 
Ministry of Justice dealt with the situation of unaccompanied minors. 
 
The interpretation of the potential criminality of unaccompanied minors makes clear how decision-
making is seen differently by the intelligence hub and by managers. “Why are unaccompanied asylum 
seekers escaping from reception centres?” was a question asked in the sixth report, which illuminates 
dilemmas concerning not only such central concepts as vulnerability and threats but also potential 
criminality. On one hand, young boys are seen as threats to public safety, because they may commit sexual 
harassment, burglary and other types of crime. On the other, those identified as children are vulnerable 
and have special needs because of their violent experiences and tremendous losses. This report was one 
of the few making extensive use of empirical data and other research. As we heard from interviewees, its 
recommendations changed how the problem was defined: it is not the youngsters who are the problem, 
but the way they are treated. They concluded that current immigration policy is part of the problem. 
Previously, minors received permanent residence permits. It was the introduction of temporary residence 
permits, respondents argued, that made them escape from reception centers. 
 
Translation from Strategic to Operational 
 
According to the intelligence doctrine, managers were free to make decisions on risk analysis or anything 
else, and how far this changed the deployment of resources is discussed in interviews (Gundhus and Jansen 
2020). One interviewee responsible for the operation said: 
 
No matter how good the product you get describing threats . . . So, then it’s not that easy for a 
decision-maker to take decisions. Even if the products are great at describing the threats and 
great in terms of assessments linked to the threats, it is not certain that the decision-makers 
will use them. (NPD 1) 
 
Interviewees also explained that it was the strategic reports that revealed an internal need for the NPIC to 
provide operational and tactical support for decision-making in police districts to ensure that knowledge 
from the intelligence reports had been acted upon. Seeing risks in reports also brings responsibility for 
acting and taking precautions: 
 
The reason for this was that they saw that they had knowledge about issues that they clearly 
believed that the districts should take measures against. NPIC didn’t want to sit on this 
knowledge without making sure that this was shared. (NPD 1) 
 
The operational part of the project was led by a manager supporting police districts with the knowledge 
necessary for coordinated tactical efforts and operations, and they said this about the reasons for 
launching this part: 
 
What I think was in the background was that, when they read the strategic products, the 
decision-makers started to think on top of that, “Okay, what if we are sitting on some potential 
ticking time bombs and we know about this now.” (NPIS 8) 
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As emerged from the interviews, risk and probabilities were not concepts in common use, which led to 
dilemmas, particularly in the operational project. Those put in the position of developing measures and 
acting on the recommendations were mainly familiar with such law enforcement measures as 
investigation and combating organized crime. 
 
The efforts initiated, therefore, resulted in several investigations of criminal cases, also leading to the 
deportation of noncitizens. Another type of action taken was order maintenance by increased patrolling at 
“hot spots.”7 According to the manager of the operational part of Operation Migrant, not enough crime 
prevention measures were deployed. Actions were mainly reactive, leading to several investigations and 
criminal cases and the policing of asylum centers at risk. 
 
The steps taken were at odds with advice in the report about unaccompanied minors. For example, 
contrary to the intelligence hub’s suggestions that there should be more crime prevention efforts helping 
the minors, the chosen measures were police controls of open drug scenes, where young offenders with 
no formal connection to the city were part of the target group. The police followed a harsh strategy focused 
on deterrence to control what was seen as a disorderly and violent drug market. Young people escaping 
from asylum centers were indirectly part of the target group (Gundhus 2020). In addition to feeling the 
need to police the open drug scene in Oslo, this approach was influenced by the desire to achieve 
deportation performance targets (Franko 2020; Gundhus 2017). One way to obtain good statistics was to 
increase the number of ID checks. Police officers on patrol were required to report all minor offenses and 
public nuisances if the suspect might be a foreigner, which made it possible to increase the use of 
immigration law in tandem with criminal law (Gundhus 2020; Lundgaard 2019). The lack of connections, 
a high degree of mobility, unknown identity, and uncertainty about age and residence status all triggered 
from Operation Migrant control efforts differed from the soft policing normally found in youth crime 
prevention (Gundhus 2020) and went beyond more inclusive multiagency collaboration. They were aimed 
at milieus frequented by both adults and minors, and minors were not recognized as such (Lidén and 
Salvesen 2016; Tyldum et al. 2015). Such approaches are important in the social production of the 
“crimmigrant other.” 
 
This situation goes against the rights of children and young people in Norway, which are supported by the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, whereby children under the age of 18, particularly 
unaccompanied refugee children, have protection and rights. There are, thus, gaps in the legally required 
provision of protection to young people (Gundhus 2020). Moreover, the social production of the 
crimmigrant other justifies penal sanctions (Franko 2020). Indeed, collecting data for intelligence is 
framed by the risk and threat aspects of the police mission. By exclusively using law enforcement logic and 
relating it to combating organized crime, this strategy can further obscure migrants’ needs and 
vulnerability. It also makes it more difficult to identify risks to them as victims of trafficking, for instance, 
or people with health problems or unaccompanied minors (Gundhus 2020). The discursive leap from 
vulnerability to organized crime resembles the one often observed in the discourse on trafficking (Aas and 
Gundhus 2014; Pickering 2011).  As Pickering (2011) points out, combating crime does not meet the needs 
of victims, and may ultimately reduce attention to their vulnerability. 
 
Dataveillance and Net-Widening 
 
The intelligence-led approach at the national level inevitably affected the scope of policing in the police 
districts. Following the identification of threats, local police operations were initiated. The national 
operation developed information needs that had to be met by the police districts, and this meant their 
performance indicators were combined with more general deportation targets. A major concern, as the 
number of migrants grew during 2015–2016, was the inability to roll out a comprehensive registration 
procedure, which affected the identification and protection of vulnerable asylum seekers (Boysen and 
Viblemo 2018). The introduction of simplified routines, together with the general sense of crisis, led to 
tighter territorial control (Immigration Law §21) conducted by the ordinary police. This affected those 
classed as “foreigners,” and control extended to satisfy the “information needs” of Operation Migrant. 
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Control efforts were entrusted to traditional policing and regulatory actors, leading to various 
combinations of border control and traditional law-enforcement rationalities, methods, and objectives 
(Gundhus 2020). As already mentioned, combining immigration law and criminal law determined which 
people were put under scrutiny. Minor offenses and fines were used as starting points for deportation 
processes. At the same time, Operation Migrant required extensive information gathering to satisfy the 
needs of the intelligence hub. Police patrols were ordered to prioritize monitoring and ensuring migrants’ 
compliance with the conditions of their residence permits, and greater efforts were made to check their 
identity and legal situation by concentrating on passports and false documents and making arrests for 
petty crimes such as shoplifting (Franko 2020; Gundhus 2017). 
 
Such state-centered responses reduce discretion and tighten the social control network around crime and 
public nuisances. The interagency collaborations of Operation Migrant were mainly concerned with law 
enforcement, the maintenance of order, and collaboration with private security guards. Standard methods 
were deployed to police areas of risk. The places and persons to be monitored were identified by local 
intelligence reports, but the risk indicators guiding data collection were decided by the intelligence hub. 
The interagency collaboration took a pragmatic approach to crime and disorder; getting the job done was 
more important than legal and philosophical questions about whether issues were crimes or 
administrative violations (cf. Sklansky 2012; Weber 2013). 
 
This led to a lopsided selection of those to be controlled, determined by nationality, class, gender, cultural 
membership, and race. It resulted in the detection of minor offenses and fines for disorderly conduct. In 
Norway, as in France, Sweden, and the UK (Franko 2020), it is striking how shifting discretion from the 
strategic to the operational or tactical level means that eastern Europeans (usually following their 
imprisonment) are prime candidates for expulsion, whether they are from EU countries or not (see more 
in Franko 2020: 118–162). The Operation Migrant focus on asylum seekers, therefore, supported existing 
orders that patrols should combine immigration law with criminal law to achieve high deportation targets. 
Strangely, efforts to control those coming from third countries outside Schengen, in practice, turn into 
intra-Schengen control efforts targeting eastern Europeans. This can be explained by the general political 
situation, which features strict immigration policies and strenuous efforts to deport foreign nationals and 
criminal-sanctioned Europe Economic Area (EEA) citizens. 
 
Pre-arrival policing went hand in hand with checking people already in Norway. This particularly affected 
people from EEA countries who were guilty of minor offenses and antisocial behavior such as begging (see 
also Franko 2020). The police rely on “creative thinking” as well as the coercive measures available to deal 
with these people (Aas 2014; Gundhus and Franko 2016). These include arrest and remand in custody, 
searching of personal belongings or dwellings, together with surveillance and tracking people’s networks. 
 
This interpretive flexibility leading to discretionary practice at the policy level has, therefore, made 
immigration control ever more important in shaping the domestic law-enforcement regimes and order-
maintenance practices of the last two decades (see inter alia Aas 2014; Aliverti 2013; Franko 2020; 
Gundhus 2017; Leun 2003; Weber 2013; Weber and Bowling 2008). The use of penal power leading to the 
social production of the crimmigrant other justifies these practices in a welfare state (Franko 2020). 
Applying immigration law to target potential criminals goes beyond the intention of the law. Diverse 
processes both inside and outside the country make migration into a penal subject. The penal welfarism 
described by Barker (2018) is also affected by dynamic interactions with external processes that are not 
based on the internal logic of the welfare state alone. This move toward criminalizing migrants chimes 
with the upgrading of the European border guard service to make Frontex even more of a law enforcement 
tool for detecting and fighting cross-border crime (Franko 2020). 
 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
As we have seen, police immigration control, where identity checks are part of a crime reduction strategy, 
is shaping the risk analysis and measures deployed. The adoption of intelligence-led policing—by Frontex 
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on the European level and by local police districts in Norway—together with high deportation targets, 
helps explain why risk profiling might have net-widening effects. 
 
These findings support Franko’s (2020: 4) argument that positioning migrants as penal subjects “is a 
multi-layered phenomenon, deeply rooted in the intricate connections between law, scientific knowledge, 
bureaucratic practices, politics, media and popular discourse.” Operation Migrant combines policing 
organized crime and the objective to deport foreigners. Through the association of crime and migration, 
law enforcement becomes a natural response to the migrants and serves to justify exclusionary and 
preemptive measures. These findings point at the importance to research the translation involved in 
applying discretionary processes of risk analysis from European to national and local levels in police 
districts. Despite variations in the effects of risk analyses, due to interpretive flexibility, there seems to be 
what Andersson (2016b) terms a vicious cycle of risk, reinforcing the view that migrants are threats and 
“risky.” Refugees are subject to digitalized border regimes and are highly monitored (Kasapoglu and Masso 
2021; Metcalfe and Dencik 2019). Inside the country, risk and threat assessment tools target increasing 
numbers of suspects. The targets are no longer asylum seekers but potentially any foreigner: the net has 
widened (Cohen 1985). 
 
Analysis reveals further how police law enforcement and order-maintenance efforts are reinforced by the 
dominant institutional logic in the police. Interpretive flexibility allows for adaptation to policy and 
political pressures. The message from Frontex that migrants are risky places this group on the spectrum 
of risk and threats. Constructions of threats are deeply embedded within power relations, as is shown by 
the fear of invasion by violent young men with a different cultural background. Discourses about the 
“dangerous immigrant” also carry with them racial ideas about the other, providing more general support 
for using penal power and helping to change the traditional criminal justice system within the nation-state 
(Bosworth, Franko, and Pickering 2018: 45–46). 
 
Political directives designed to strengthen the return policy make it harder to argue for inclusive 
approaches to “young strangers,” in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. As the welfare 
services withdraw, the police have more room for maneuver. As in other Western countries, the police are 
taking on a wider range of tasks, including those traditionally carried out by welfare agencies (McCarthy 
2014: 165). The Ministry of Justice and the police have made deportation one of the central performance 
indicators in the new public management system (Gundhus 2017), setting similar deportation targets to 
those in countries such as France, Spain, and the UK. 
 
To summarize: first, the performance management system is important for understanding these 
discretionary processes and how risk is governed. Targets for forced returns of nonnationals with criminal 
convictions and police districts’ work on initiating expulsion cases have played a crucial role in increasing 
deportations (National Police Directorate 2014a). Second, the figure of the crimmigrant other is also 
important in triggering law enforcement and making it a natural response to migration (Franko 2020). It 
legitimizes the suspicious gaze that identifies potentially criminal migrants (Gundhus and Jansen 2020). 
Discursive and coercive operational practices are, therefore, co-constitutive in conceptualizing and 
pursuing security in the policing of migration in Norway. Policing migrants as signals of pre-crime not only 
serves to define the nature of a polity but also, as Brown (2010: 71) points out, offers a promise of 
protection and a way of distinguishing between friends and enemies by applying a language of 
criminalization. The risk assessment tools that distinguish members and nonmembers may be essential 
for the successful ordering of society but necessarily involve a suspicious gaze that produces suspect 
identities (Cole 2001). As mentioned in the background section, one objective of intelligence-led policing 
is to match the use of force and resources to the actual threat; it should generate actionable knowledge. 
This preemptive approach has unintended consequences for migrants’ situations; they become 
disproportionately exposed to police control. 
 
Third, Frontex’s risk discourse has provided tools to reinforce the national security response through its 
language and practice of risk analysis. In the agency’s definition of risk, the border is seen as “vulnerable,” 
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while the people crossing it are constructed as threats. Through its sizeable Risk Analysis Unit and its 
Europe-wide network for collating data on border crossings (the Frontex Risk Analysis Network), Frontex 
“exports” risk thinking to member state agencies, reinforcing the threat and security frames in operation 
on national levels (Andersson 2016b). However, the definition of risk and threats are also translated, and 
the way the different meanings of (in)security and vulnerability are related to police security practices at 
European, national, and local levels provides a framework of multiscalar bordering. The analyses show 
how the discretionary decisions related to risk assessments at various levels—Frontex, national, and 
local—are made more or less important, depending on the context in which they were co-constructed. 
 
The article, therefore, speaks to the complexity of multiscalar bordering and how “things get 
lost/enhanced” in multiscalar translation. Risk assessments are drawn in different directions by different 
actors, but they lead to hot spots and “hot” people, law enforcement, and order-maintenance efforts. 
Intelligence-driven agencies produce criminalization not only through institutional arrangements, 
procedures, and law enforcement measures but also by how notions of security, risk, threats, and solutions 
are conceptualized. These institutional arrangements are multilayered and translated into national 
contexts, ideally dynamically, though practically through top-down processes (Paul 2017). As Andersson 
(2014) comments on Frontex’s thought work, it influences EU policy-makers’ perceptions (and policies), 
resource allocation, and member states’ access to funding and defines the rationale of its own operations 
(see also Horii 2016). Risk assessment requires data to be collected, not just aggregated data, but more 
and more personal data, which then feeds back into risk assessment because of how it is subsequently 
evaluated (Gundhus 2018). The way risk and crime predictions are co-constructed and context-dependent 
also directs our attention to the understandings of crime that different actors and software work with and 
reproduce in policing (Kaufman 2018). 
 
It will be of interest to future researchers to examine to what degree the ambiguities of who the targets 
are, and the possibility of being flexible about this, place a broader group somewhere on the member–
nonmember spectrum of risk and threat, with the understanding that everyone within this spectrum might 
become a suspect in the face of police requests for threat assessments. As Andrejevic (2018: 102) says, 
risk will score at some point, and being part of the group will pose a potential risk. This pushes the 
categorization beyond being a disciplinary system that separates deviants from nondeviants and 
introduces a more actuarial system, placing everyone along a broader spectrum. Potential dangerousness 
exists everywhere and is conditioned by anything connected to individuals’ identity attributes, as it is an 
inherent part of the actuarial surveillance system (Andrejevic 2018). 
 
Following a preemptive logic, migration control has become more interested in the criminal potential of 
groups and networks rather than in the individual’s past and actual crime that has been carried out; a 
forward-looking approach has been adopted based on historical data (Gundhus and Jansen 2020). This 
change leads to a shift from discourses of punishment and moral considerations of legal offenses toward 
asking who a person is (i.e., toward attributes such as their citizenship, nationality, race, identity issues, 
and moral conduct). Seeing an uncertain identity as dangerous leads to the use of more coercive methods 
to secure it; this has been described as the criminalization of identity (Aas 2013; Aradau and Van Munster 
2007). Controlling migration as a future risk connects it to crime and terrorism in ways that may make 
migrants and asylum seekers into potential criminals or terrorists (Gundhus and Jansen 2020). When the 
police take on new tasks, including ones traditionally carried out by welfare agencies for vulnerable 
groups, one may ask whether a control device is being constructed that is completely different from that 
used for the rest of the population, without any discussion of where this leads, what legal implications it 
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1 Scholars have shown how the practices of Frontex relate to the securitization of migration, and introduce neoliberal, 
managerial logics of risk into border security (Bigo 2014; Chillaud 2012; Léonard 2010; Neal 2009; Skleparis 2016; Vaughan-
Williams 2010). Recent research has also drawn attention to the increasing appropriation of humanitarian and human rights 
discourses by Frontex to legitimize border practices (Aas and Gundhus 2014; Fassin 2011; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Perkowski 
2016; Vaughan-Williams 2017). A third strand is situated at the intersection of critical security studies and new 
institutionalism (Bigo 2014; Boswell and Hampshire 2017). As Perkowski (2016) argues, this makes it possible to 
conceptualize Frontex not as a unified institution but as one characterized by multiple (securitized, managerial, humanitarian) 
rationalities. 
2 Frontex was originally the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders. 
3 The interviews were recorded and transcribed and conducted together with Pia Jansen. Those interviewed from the National 
Police Investigation Service have the initials NPIS and those from the National Police Directorate have the initials NPD. 
4 Conducted with Niri Talberg and Christin Wathne, 2017–2018. 
5 Conducted by Danel Hammer (Autumn 2018), Siri Martinsen Nesteng (Autumn 2018), and Pernille Erichsen Skjevrak (May 
2019), all supervised by Helene OI Gundhus. 
6 In 2016, Norway received 3,460 applications for protection. This is a decrease of 89 percent compared to 2015. There were 
11,480 applications in 2014. The highest number received in one year before 2015 was in 2002, when we received 17,480 
applications. 
7 As several scholars claim, this type of policing might also have consequences for police–citizen interactions and trust in the 
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